Netflix announced today on its blog that it will begin monthly rankings of the ISPs who deliver its content to end users. In its first report, new provider Google Fiber, available only in parts of Kansas City right now, topped the charts with a less-than-blistering 2.55 Mbps average speed.
The interesting points to me:
All the cable and telco MSOs Netflix-reported speeds are way below the typically quoted speeds they offer. This is likely a result several factors all related to the fact that it the speed at which content makes it from a server to an end-user is a lot different from the speed at which data travels from the ISP to the end-user's modem. Content can be bogged-down by connections from Netflix to the ISP itself, competition from other content sharing the ISPs connection to your neighborhood, competition from other other content coming down the user's own connection at the same time and on the wifi link within the consumer's home. Also, most ISPs offer multiple tiers of service (my ISP, Time Warner Cable, offers five different tiers of service $85/month for 50 Mbps Ultimate to $20 for 3 Mbps Basic); Verizon wireless offers 4G LTE in some areas, only 3G in others), but Netflix has averaged them all together here.
Google Fiber is the fastest provider, but per Netflix it isn't that much faster than the top performing cable and telco competitors. Google Fiber scores 16% better than Verizon's FiOS (2.19) and 24% better than Suddenlink (2.06), the laggard of that group; 20% or so is a significant difference, but not nearly 100 times faster that Google Fiber was supposed to represent. Perhaps a lot of the early customers for Google Fiber are selecting the "free" 5 Mbps service instead of the $70/month gigabit (1000Mbps) service. Alternately, if the difference between today's Google Fiber and today's cable is only 20%, that's probably a gap the cable guys can meet by methods other than running fiber to the home.
DSL is significantly slower than cable and, on average, traditional mobile is slower still. Clearwire looks like the equivalent of poor DSL by this measure.
I look forward to an interesting report card on ISPs every month. Information is power and facts futher the discussion. Kudos to Netflix in putting this out.
An earlier post on earlier Neflix ISP ratings (from October 2011)
12 December 2012
06 December 2012
Disney Takes the Pay TV Window to Netflix
Disney has chosen to sell its movies for the pay TV window to Netflix. Netflix, in effect, replaces Starz, Disney's output home since 1994. While some have described this as a watershed moment for over-the-top or a "game changer", it seems far simpler -- a seller of a product, unhappy with the prices offered by its current buyer, seeks a new buyer.
In 2008, instead of accepting the output terms offered by Showtime, Lion's Gate, Paramount and MGM formed Epix. Epix hasn't been a huge hit with traditional pay TV operators, but had turned a profit on the basis of deals with Netflix and Amazon.
Looking at the dynamic from the other side, why didn't Starz and Showtime pay up to renew these pay TV window theatrical output deals? The short answer is that they see a better return on investments in original programming. Showtime gets a lot more bang from creating a series like Homeland or Dexter or Californication than it gets from airing The Dictator after it is available in theatres, airlines, Blu-Rays, DVDs, iTunes and pay-per-view/on demand. Theatrical movies have value -- subscribers to premium networks watch them and like them -- but theatricals don't build a premium network's brand.
The Disney studio really couldn't care less about Starz except as a source of revenue. After all, in 1994 Disney rejected the more established premium service Showtime to go with Starz, which was the upstart premium service from the company then known as Encore, after its second-run movie service.
It appears that Disney takes little risk in leaving the traditional premium TV buyers. If Disney's movies on Netflix are thinly viewed, that information won't be public and to the extent the movies are not watched that much, presumably they would have more value for Disney's other buyers. If a content provider like the NFL took a package of games to Netflix, if the games were unsuccessful and thinly viewed on the new platform, it could damage the value of the NFL brand when the league returned to its traditional buyers (the networks and the advertisers); at a minimum, it would be in a poorer bargaining position. Major League Baseball experienced this with the ill-fated The Baseball Network.
Disney has some special value to Netflix versus its value to Starz. Netflix gets more value out of children's library programming than a cable premium service does (in fact, Starz might not have had such rights from Disney and Starz faces an increasingly crowded cable TV shelf which often also offers the subscription video on demand service Disney Family Movies). For Netflix the deal has obvious benefits. This Disney deal replaces much of the high value content that Netflix was getting from Disney via Netflix's since expired Starz deal. Losing the Starz brand means little in Netflix's environment -- where the title of the movie is the brand in the mind of the consumer and the only prominent exception to that is when Disney or Disney-owned Pixar's name is attached to a movie for children. If this deal is a game changer, it is hard to see what has materially changed from the perspective of Netflix subscribers.
The change, if anything, is to the mindset of the movie studios -- there's another way to play the pay TV window. Going direct to a distributor to end-users like Netflix also allows Disney a more direct path to negotiate how its content is displayed to end users. Disney was not happy when Starz did a year-long "free preview" with Dish Network.
Netflix is the 800-pound gorilla of over-the-top services, right now, and getting high profile content on an exclusive basis creates less short-term opportunity for its competitors, be they Amazon Instant Video/Prime or the launching-in-2013, clumsily named Redbox Instant by Verizon. From a business strategy standpoint, Netflix's primary advantage is that it is the first-mover in OTT. Making entry into the market much more expensive for a joint venture like Redbox-Verizon's is a great business strategy -- 50/50 partners are never as committed to a new venture. (Ted Turner pulled this trick on the ABC-Westinghouse Broadcasting joint venture Satellite News Channel in the earliest days of CNN by creating Headline News and giving it to operators for free with CNN.)
So, what's not to like if you are Netflix? Potentially, the price. More than one analyst has looked at Netflix's content payment obligations and not liked what he has seen. Netflix may need to continue very strong subscriber growth to makes this and its other expensive content deals pay off for its investors.
Updated (6 December 2012): Ted Sarandos, Netflix's Chief Content Officer said yesterday that he has no intention of releasing any numbers for the viewing of Netflix's original shows. "It's really an irrelevant number" for a subscription service. It's a slightly different context, but it is consistent with the "no publicity" benefit of the deal to Disney. Note the argument that subscription services don't care about ratings, they care about satisfaction, is an old one -- originally cable TV operators and programmers identified it as a reason that they would triumph over broadcasters.
Related post: Starz Walks Away from Netflix
In 2008, instead of accepting the output terms offered by Showtime, Lion's Gate, Paramount and MGM formed Epix. Epix hasn't been a huge hit with traditional pay TV operators, but had turned a profit on the basis of deals with Netflix and Amazon.
Looking at the dynamic from the other side, why didn't Starz and Showtime pay up to renew these pay TV window theatrical output deals? The short answer is that they see a better return on investments in original programming. Showtime gets a lot more bang from creating a series like Homeland or Dexter or Californication than it gets from airing The Dictator after it is available in theatres, airlines, Blu-Rays, DVDs, iTunes and pay-per-view/on demand. Theatrical movies have value -- subscribers to premium networks watch them and like them -- but theatricals don't build a premium network's brand.
The Disney studio really couldn't care less about Starz except as a source of revenue. After all, in 1994 Disney rejected the more established premium service Showtime to go with Starz, which was the upstart premium service from the company then known as Encore, after its second-run movie service.
It appears that Disney takes little risk in leaving the traditional premium TV buyers. If Disney's movies on Netflix are thinly viewed, that information won't be public and to the extent the movies are not watched that much, presumably they would have more value for Disney's other buyers. If a content provider like the NFL took a package of games to Netflix, if the games were unsuccessful and thinly viewed on the new platform, it could damage the value of the NFL brand when the league returned to its traditional buyers (the networks and the advertisers); at a minimum, it would be in a poorer bargaining position. Major League Baseball experienced this with the ill-fated The Baseball Network.
Disney has some special value to Netflix versus its value to Starz. Netflix gets more value out of children's library programming than a cable premium service does (in fact, Starz might not have had such rights from Disney and Starz faces an increasingly crowded cable TV shelf which often also offers the subscription video on demand service Disney Family Movies). For Netflix the deal has obvious benefits. This Disney deal replaces much of the high value content that Netflix was getting from Disney via Netflix's since expired Starz deal. Losing the Starz brand means little in Netflix's environment -- where the title of the movie is the brand in the mind of the consumer and the only prominent exception to that is when Disney or Disney-owned Pixar's name is attached to a movie for children. If this deal is a game changer, it is hard to see what has materially changed from the perspective of Netflix subscribers.
The change, if anything, is to the mindset of the movie studios -- there's another way to play the pay TV window. Going direct to a distributor to end-users like Netflix also allows Disney a more direct path to negotiate how its content is displayed to end users. Disney was not happy when Starz did a year-long "free preview" with Dish Network.
Netflix is the 800-pound gorilla of over-the-top services, right now, and getting high profile content on an exclusive basis creates less short-term opportunity for its competitors, be they Amazon Instant Video/Prime or the launching-in-2013, clumsily named Redbox Instant by Verizon. From a business strategy standpoint, Netflix's primary advantage is that it is the first-mover in OTT. Making entry into the market much more expensive for a joint venture like Redbox-Verizon's is a great business strategy -- 50/50 partners are never as committed to a new venture. (Ted Turner pulled this trick on the ABC-Westinghouse Broadcasting joint venture Satellite News Channel in the earliest days of CNN by creating Headline News and giving it to operators for free with CNN.)
So, what's not to like if you are Netflix? Potentially, the price. More than one analyst has looked at Netflix's content payment obligations and not liked what he has seen. Netflix may need to continue very strong subscriber growth to makes this and its other expensive content deals pay off for its investors.
Updated (6 December 2012): Ted Sarandos, Netflix's Chief Content Officer said yesterday that he has no intention of releasing any numbers for the viewing of Netflix's original shows. "It's really an irrelevant number" for a subscription service. It's a slightly different context, but it is consistent with the "no publicity" benefit of the deal to Disney. Note the argument that subscription services don't care about ratings, they care about satisfaction, is an old one -- originally cable TV operators and programmers identified it as a reason that they would triumph over broadcasters.
Related post: Starz Walks Away from Netflix
Labels:
competition,
Disney,
Netflix,
over-the-top,
Redbox,
Starz,
Verizon
05 December 2012
The Problem with "Just Drop the Channels"
Glenn Britt, the CEO of Time Warner Cable, announced his strategy to deal with rising programming costs at the UBS conference on Monday -- simply drop the poorly viewed channels.
If it were only so easy.
The fact is that the vast majority of the cable operator's programming dollars are going to a handful, or so, of major programming companies which bundle their channels together in one form or another.
CNBC is an interesting, relatively thinly-viewed niche service (how many outside of the 1% are interested in financial news?). However, if Time Warner Cable were to drop CNBC over its costs, it might have a "challenge" getting a favorable renewal on the other channels in the NBC Universal portfolio (to name a few: USA, Syfy, E!, Bravo, Oxygen, Style, NBC Sports Network, The Weather Channel, Golf and regional sports networks in Chicago, New England, Philadelphia and the Bay Area and the NBC and Telemundo affiliates in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and a handful of other major markets).
ESPN Classic is an interesting, relatively thinly-viewed niche service (how many outside of serious, older sports fans are interested in replays of events?). However, if Time Warner Cable were to drop ESPN Classic over its costs, it might have a "challenge" getting a favorable renewal on the other channels in the ESPN/Disney portfolio (to name a few: Disney Channel, ESPN, ABC Family, ESPN2, Disney XD, Disney Jr., ESPN U, ESPN News and the ABC affiliates in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and a handful of other major markets).
Fox Soccer Channel is an interesting, relatively thinly-viewed niche service (how many soccer fans are there in the US?). However, if Time Warner Cable were to drop Fox Soccer Channel over its costs, it might have a "challenge" getting a favorable renewal on the other channels in the Fox portfolio (to name a few: Fox News, FX, and regional sports networks in Los Angeles, Detroit and Houston and the Fox affiliates in New York, Los Angeles and Chicago and a few handfuls of other markets).
See a pattern here?
The other major cable programming companies account for almost all of the rest of the license fees paid by cable operators.
The sad fact for Time Warner Cable is that there is precious little programming expense with the independent channels that can be dropped without having an impact on the deal for another channel, a fact of which I am 100% certain he is aware. I should note that Time Warner Cable recently agreed to a deal to carry the NFL Network, so clearly that's not (a) part of the problem that Glenn Britt is describing or (b) leaving TWC anytime soon.
The ecosystem of programming is paid for by fees paid by the distributor (what the cable networks call license fees) and fees paid by advertisers (advertising, naturally). It seems only logical that the way for the distributors to pay less for programming is if they can help the networks get more money from advertisers. The usual way this is done is by getting a break on the license fee for one channel by agreeing to a broad roll out a new service, but there are other possible options as well (involving shifts of advertising inventory, use of dynamic ad insertion).
Time Warner CEO Jeff Bewkes (Glenn Britt's former boss when TWC was a subsidiary of Time Warner Inc.) noted later at the same conference, the pay-TV system is robust and can take the price hikes: "Other than the concentrated viewing and cost of sports, the rest of the bundle is a better value than ever." The programmers's proposed solution is to raise license fees and add value to the subscription via TV Everywhere. There is a logic to that approach and it is consistent with the higher-fees-more-value history of cable programming. Until the system breaks -- material declines in multichannel penetration would be a symptom -- it is hard to imagine the managers changing the playbook.
The lingering question to me is why was Glenn Britt staking out this public position?
If it were only so easy.
The fact is that the vast majority of the cable operator's programming dollars are going to a handful, or so, of major programming companies which bundle their channels together in one form or another.
CNBC is an interesting, relatively thinly-viewed niche service (how many outside of the 1% are interested in financial news?). However, if Time Warner Cable were to drop CNBC over its costs, it might have a "challenge" getting a favorable renewal on the other channels in the NBC Universal portfolio (to name a few: USA, Syfy, E!, Bravo, Oxygen, Style, NBC Sports Network, The Weather Channel, Golf and regional sports networks in Chicago, New England, Philadelphia and the Bay Area and the NBC and Telemundo affiliates in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and a handful of other major markets).
ESPN Classic is an interesting, relatively thinly-viewed niche service (how many outside of serious, older sports fans are interested in replays of events?). However, if Time Warner Cable were to drop ESPN Classic over its costs, it might have a "challenge" getting a favorable renewal on the other channels in the ESPN/Disney portfolio (to name a few: Disney Channel, ESPN, ABC Family, ESPN2, Disney XD, Disney Jr., ESPN U, ESPN News and the ABC affiliates in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and a handful of other major markets).
Fox Soccer Channel is an interesting, relatively thinly-viewed niche service (how many soccer fans are there in the US?). However, if Time Warner Cable were to drop Fox Soccer Channel over its costs, it might have a "challenge" getting a favorable renewal on the other channels in the Fox portfolio (to name a few: Fox News, FX, and regional sports networks in Los Angeles, Detroit and Houston and the Fox affiliates in New York, Los Angeles and Chicago and a few handfuls of other markets).
See a pattern here?
The other major cable programming companies account for almost all of the rest of the license fees paid by cable operators.
- Time Warner: HBO, CNN, TBS, TNT, Cartoon, TruTV, Cinemax, TCM, Headline News
- CBS: Showtime, CBS Sports Network, CBS and CW affiliates in many markets
- Discovery Communications: Discovery, TLC, Animal Planet, Investigation Discovery, OWN
- A&E Networks: History, A&E, Lifetime, Lifetime Movie Network, Bio
- Scripps Networks: HGTV, Food, DIY, Cooking, Travel, Great American Country
- AMC Networks: AMC, WE, IFC, Sundance
The sad fact for Time Warner Cable is that there is precious little programming expense with the independent channels that can be dropped without having an impact on the deal for another channel, a fact of which I am 100% certain he is aware. I should note that Time Warner Cable recently agreed to a deal to carry the NFL Network, so clearly that's not (a) part of the problem that Glenn Britt is describing or (b) leaving TWC anytime soon.
The ecosystem of programming is paid for by fees paid by the distributor (what the cable networks call license fees) and fees paid by advertisers (advertising, naturally). It seems only logical that the way for the distributors to pay less for programming is if they can help the networks get more money from advertisers. The usual way this is done is by getting a break on the license fee for one channel by agreeing to a broad roll out a new service, but there are other possible options as well (involving shifts of advertising inventory, use of dynamic ad insertion).
Time Warner CEO Jeff Bewkes (Glenn Britt's former boss when TWC was a subsidiary of Time Warner Inc.) noted later at the same conference, the pay-TV system is robust and can take the price hikes: "Other than the concentrated viewing and cost of sports, the rest of the bundle is a better value than ever." The programmers's proposed solution is to raise license fees and add value to the subscription via TV Everywhere. There is a logic to that approach and it is consistent with the higher-fees-more-value history of cable programming. Until the system breaks -- material declines in multichannel penetration would be a symptom -- it is hard to imagine the managers changing the playbook.
The lingering question to me is why was Glenn Britt staking out this public position?
- a PR salvo to lay some groundwork for future short-term channel drops during heated negotiations?
- a cry to regulators to get involved?
- something else?
25 November 2012
My Experience Buying a Cable Modem with Time Warner Cable
On 15 October 2012, Time Warner Cable started charging a separate rental fee for its cable modems of $3.95 per month. Prior to that date, the cable modem fee was bundled into the cost of the service, providing a customer with little reason to purchase a modem on his or her own.
Time Warner Cable deploys 40+ different modems, but is authorizing only 5 for my level of service. The modem that they supplied me, a Turbo customer, was the Thomson/RCA DCM425. This is a DOCSIS 2.0 unit which retails for about $50. At that purchase price, the breakeven on $3.95 per month savings in rental fees is just over 12 months -- a hell of a return (a simple IRR about 87% annually if the modem has a 4-year life -- actually better than that since the savings on the modem are doled out each month rather than at the end of each year and better still if the rental price of the equipment goes up, which would not be without precedent in the annals of the cable industry -- IRR calculations are available here).
However, the least expensive modem that they will authorize for my level of serviceis a Motorola SB6141. This modem meets the DOCSIS 3.0 spec and represents the latest commercially available cable modem technology. This modem would cost about $115. That return is about 23% annually if the modem has a problem-free 4-year life.
I also learned from TWC tech support that the "Turbo" service, while not requiring a DOCSIS 3.0 modem will actually work faster with such a modem. The DOCSIS 3.0 modem would also work with any higher speed service which is something I have considered getting. The differences between the DOCSIS specs mainly boils down to the fact that the 3.0 modem is more future-proof than the 2.0 modem.
Hmmm, what one would really want is for TWC to rent the DOCSIS 3.0 modem for $3.95. I went to their store and asked for just that. No dice. TWC's rep would only give me a new version of the same Thomson/RCA modem I had. When I got it home, it worked exactly the same way the old one did. About 16 Mbps downstream and 0.7 Mbps upstream.
I did like the idea of faster service and, 19% annually is a lot better than my portfolio typically yields.
After waiting for the early purchasers to get through the system, I found a new Motorola SB6141 from a well-regarded eBay seller which I won at auction for $97.50.
I connected it and got it authorized by TWC over the phone in about 5 minutes on a Saturday morning. I did have to wait about 40 minutes to return my old modem to TWC at their store. Going to their store at 11AM on a Saturday is not recommended.
Bottom line: My downstream speed is now about 19 Mbps (a figure I got on occasion before, but not regularly) and my upstream speed is now about 2 Mbps (a figure way better than I ever got before). If my modem lasts 4 years, it will give me a return of about 33% annually and provide performance call it safely ~10%+ better than I was getting. That's a good deal provided that the risk of failure of the modem is modest.
How did TWC do? On the downside: TWC sprung a fee on their customers on 2-weeks notice, they required the purchase of more expensive equipment than they provide themselves and made me wait 40 minutes simply to return something to them. On the plus side, the authorization couldn't have been easier. It wasn't the greatest performance by a cable operator, but it was adequate.
More resources: stories in Multichannel News and New York Times Bits Blog
![]() |
| TWC's terse little message about the fee was sent on a postcard |
![]() |
| Thomson/RCA DCM425, prefers to be horizontal |
![]() |
| Motorola SB6141, jauntily vertical |
Hmmm, what one would really want is for TWC to rent the DOCSIS 3.0 modem for $3.95. I went to their store and asked for just that. No dice. TWC's rep would only give me a new version of the same Thomson/RCA modem I had. When I got it home, it worked exactly the same way the old one did. About 16 Mbps downstream and 0.7 Mbps upstream.
I did like the idea of faster service and, 19% annually is a lot better than my portfolio typically yields.
After waiting for the early purchasers to get through the system, I found a new Motorola SB6141 from a well-regarded eBay seller which I won at auction for $97.50.
I connected it and got it authorized by TWC over the phone in about 5 minutes on a Saturday morning. I did have to wait about 40 minutes to return my old modem to TWC at their store. Going to their store at 11AM on a Saturday is not recommended.
Bottom line: My downstream speed is now about 19 Mbps (a figure I got on occasion before, but not regularly) and my upstream speed is now about 2 Mbps (a figure way better than I ever got before). If my modem lasts 4 years, it will give me a return of about 33% annually and provide performance call it safely ~10%+ better than I was getting. That's a good deal provided that the risk of failure of the modem is modest.
How did TWC do? On the downside: TWC sprung a fee on their customers on 2-weeks notice, they required the purchase of more expensive equipment than they provide themselves and made me wait 40 minutes simply to return something to them. On the plus side, the authorization couldn't have been easier. It wasn't the greatest performance by a cable operator, but it was adequate.
More resources: stories in Multichannel News and New York Times Bits Blog
Labels:
DOCSIS,
modem,
Motorola,
RCA,
Time Warner Cable
02 November 2012
AMC's Big Benefits from the Voom Settlement with Dish
I thought that I would put a bit of a finer point on the benefits to AMC in the Dish settlement over the Voom matter. Rich Greenfield of BTIG Research did a nice job on his blog of breaking down some of the carriage benefits that AMC Networks gained (reg. req'd), I wanted to take his analysis a step further.
Relevant facts:
When the Dish affiliation agreement with AMC Networks expired on 30 June 2012, Dish dropped AMC, Independent Film Channel (IFC) and WeTV. At the end of 2Q12, Dish reported that it had a total of 14.061 million subscribers. Making some very broad assumptions:
Beyond the analysis I have done here ($480 million+ for those keeping score at home), this is a highly unusual settlement for Dish Network. Dish, more than most other distributors. tries to push services into its higher level tiers (to reduce costs and/or increase ARPU -- average revenue per unit). For example, AT200 includes the following services which are rarely carried in anything but expanded basic level on cable (and all are carried in DirecTV's Choice package, as of today):
Relevant facts:
When the Dish affiliation agreement with AMC Networks expired on 30 June 2012, Dish dropped AMC, Independent Film Channel (IFC) and WeTV. At the end of 2Q12, Dish reported that it had a total of 14.061 million subscribers. Making some very broad assumptions:
- 10% of its subscribers essentially get only foreign language programming, therefore
- 90% of its subscribers get its most highly penetrated basic package, America's Top 120 (AT120) ~12.7 million subscribers
- 2/3 of those subscribers (or 60% of the total) get its second most highly penetrated basic package, America's Top 200 which is a subset of AT120 ~8.4 million subscribers
- 1/3 of AT120 subscribers (or 30% of the total) get its third most highly penetrated basic package, America's Top 250 which is a subset of AT250 ~4.2 million subscribers
Based on my experience, the middle package probably does better than 2/3 and the bottom package does worse than 1/3, but I'll use these figures to keep the analysis simple.
When the services were dropped, AMC, IFC and WeTV were all carried in AT200. The services were all relaunched in AT120. A service like AMC which is fully distributed across the multichannel universe, is typically valued at $25 per subscriber; less-than-ubiquitous services like IFC and We TV valuations are typically lower, say $15 per subscriber. In aggregate, the asset value increase in distribution could be worth ~$230 million to AMC Networks.
Additionally, Dish agreed to launch Sundance Channel, which Dish previously only carried on a likely-thinly-penetrated Blockbuster-branded Internet-delivered package, on AT250. Throwing that in at $15 per subscriber adds another $60 million or so in value.
Additionally, Dish agreed to launch Fuse, a service not owned by AMC Networks, but by the commonly controlled Madison Square Garden Company (MSG), in AT120. Fuse, for those unfamiliar with it, is a not-very-highly-rated music service comparable to MTV before it was remade as a reality service. Dish had a bit of a tortured history with Fuse, having dropped the channel in July 2010. Valuing this distribution at $15 per subscriber, there is another $190 million in value.
That is not the end of the benefits that MSG got in the deal as Dish also dropped its FCC program access complaint against MSG regarding the MSG and MSG Plus regional sports networks (which control the local rights to the NBA's New York Knicks and the NHL's New York Rangers, New York Islanders, New Jersey Devils and Buffalo Sabres). This complaint dated back to September 2010. It is difficult to put a price tag on making this complaint go away. but it is certainly a benefit to MSG. While it would have been a better outcome for MSG to regain the distribution of its regional sports networks, eliminating the risk of an unfavorable program access complaint has value in reduced legal fees and eliminating a potentially damaging precedent that could be cited by other distributors.
It will be interesting to see how much MSG's shareholders are compensating AMC's shareholders for these benefits; that disclosure should make it into the companies's annual reports, since the benefits fall in the fourth quarter.
Beyond the analysis I have done here ($480 million+ for those keeping score at home), this is a highly unusual settlement for Dish Network. Dish, more than most other distributors. tries to push services into its higher level tiers (to reduce costs and/or increase ARPU -- average revenue per unit). For example, AT200 includes the following services which are rarely carried in anything but expanded basic level on cable (and all are carried in DirecTV's Choice package, as of today):
- Animal Planet
- BET
- Bravo
- Golf
- Hallmark
- MSNBC
- National Geographic
- Tru TV
- Turner Classic Movies
- source for this list (retrieved 2 November 2012)
While many believed AMC Networks did not do well in the Voom settlement because they had requested $2.5 billion in damages, the trial appeared to be going all AMC's way and the settlement payment of $700 million was below the $1 billion expectations, perhaps the financial analysts should take a closer look at the details.
Given the very favorable (for AMC) settlement of the services's packaging, it is my opinion that AMC probably did pretty well on the license fees for the services as well. These precedents add value to AMC Networks directly, but also create precedents that AMC can use to demand more from smaller multichannel distributors, and everyone but Comcast and DirecTV is smaller than Dish.
There can be tremendous value in favorable cable network distribution agreements.
Updated 6 November 2012: Dish released its 3Q12 10-Q today which contained this disclosure about the Voom settlement
Updated 6 November 2012: Dish released its 3Q12 10-Q today which contained this disclosure about the Voom settlement
Since the Voom Settlement Agreement and the multi-year affiliation agreement were entered into contemporaneously, we accounted for all components of both agreements at fair value in the context of the Voom Settlement Agreement. We have determined the fair value of the multi-year affiliation agreement and the MVDDS Licenses using a market-based approach and a probability-weighted discounted cash flow analysis, respectively. Based on market data and similar agreements we have with other content providers, we allocated $54 million of the payments under the multi-year affiliation agreement to the fair value of the Voom Settlement Agreement. Evaluating all potential uses for the MVDDS Licenses, we assessed their fair value at $24 million. The fair value of the MVDDS Licenses will be recorded during the fourth quarter 2012. The Voom Settlement Agreement is considered a Type I subsequent event and our $730 million estimated fair value of this settlement is recorded as “Litigation expense” on our Condensed Consolidated Statement of Operations and Comprehensive Income (Loss) for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2012. Additionally, $676 million and $54 million are recorded on our Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets as “Litigation accrual” and “Accrued Programming,” respectively. The resulting liability related to the multi-year affiliation agreement will be amortized as contra “Subscriber-related expenses” on a straight-line basis over the term of the agreement.
What I think this means is that Dish thinks its aggregate license fee payments for the services (AMC, IFC, WeTV, Sundance and Fuse) in the affiliation agreements are going to be $54 million higher than fair market value over the term of those agreements. Typically channels are paid for on a per-subscriber basis. Dish might see its rates as higher-than-market and/or its carriage requirements as higher-than-market (the latter leading to higher license fee payments because of a greater number of service subscribers). I strongly suspect the interpretation than Dish is taking is that its rates alone are higher-than-market. If we knew the length of the term of the affiliation agreement, it might be possible to estimate the rate premium that Dish has accepted here. The $54 accrued programming liability is equal to about $4.11 per my estimate of the AT120 subs (90% of Dish's 3Q12 end of period total subscribers of 14.052 million). Here's the premium on a per-AT120 sub-per-month basis for various terms:
The rates in the middle of this list are not far from the market rates for Fuse. Perhaps Dish is looking at the Fuse agreement alone as the source of this "excess payment". Note that in its disclosure of the settlement, AMC referred to the affiliation agreement as "long term". By the standards of the cable TV industry, that suggests a term of at least five years. Given the very favorable carriage of the AMC networks (and Fuse), a long term commitment for that carriage would be more valuable to the programmer than a rate premium.
Updated 8 November 2012: AMC Networks reported its 3Q12 results today. In its press release, there is no mention that AMC received any consideration from MSG for AMC's part in gaining carriage on Dish for MSG's Fuse service as part of the Voom settlement.
Updated 7 December 2012: The Madison Square Garden Company reported its 3Q12 results on 2 November 2012. In its 10-Q, there is a single sentence on page 22 about Fuse: "Dish Network LLC resumed carriage of Fuse on November 1, 2012 pursuant to a long-term affiliation agreement." There is no mention that MSG provided any consideration for AMC's part in gaining carriage on Dish for Fuse service or that such carriage was part of the Voom settlement. It seems that the MSGC shareholders got this benefit from the AMCN shareholders at no cost, which doesn't seem quite right.
- 1 year: $0.342
- 2 years: $0.172
- 3 years: $0.114
- 4 years: $0.086
- 5 years: $0.068
- 6 years: $0.057
- 7 years: $0.049
- 8 years: $0.043
- 9 years: $0.038
- 10 years: $0.034
The rates in the middle of this list are not far from the market rates for Fuse. Perhaps Dish is looking at the Fuse agreement alone as the source of this "excess payment". Note that in its disclosure of the settlement, AMC referred to the affiliation agreement as "long term". By the standards of the cable TV industry, that suggests a term of at least five years. Given the very favorable carriage of the AMC networks (and Fuse), a long term commitment for that carriage would be more valuable to the programmer than a rate premium.
Updated 8 November 2012: AMC Networks reported its 3Q12 results today. In its press release, there is no mention that AMC received any consideration from MSG for AMC's part in gaining carriage on Dish for MSG's Fuse service as part of the Voom settlement.
Updated 7 December 2012: The Madison Square Garden Company reported its 3Q12 results on 2 November 2012. In its 10-Q, there is a single sentence on page 22 about Fuse: "Dish Network LLC resumed carriage of Fuse on November 1, 2012 pursuant to a long-term affiliation agreement." There is no mention that MSG provided any consideration for AMC's part in gaining carriage on Dish for Fuse service or that such carriage was part of the Voom settlement. It seems that the MSGC shareholders got this benefit from the AMCN shareholders at no cost, which doesn't seem quite right.
26 October 2012
The Future of Current
The New York Post reports today that Current TV, the network best known as the brief post-CNBC home of available-now Keith Olbermann, is on the block.
A 60-million subscriber network is usually worth at least $15 per subscriber or $750 million, sometimes considerably more. However, one wonders what, exactly, is the programming opportunity for Current. Fox News is the news service on the right, MSNBC is the news service on the left and CNN is the news service in the middle. Not that Current is, strictly speaking, a news service, being more about talk shows than newscasts. Headline News has also morphed from a news service into a talk show channel.
Despite the attractive qualities of news programming (original, live and essentially DVR-proof), there is little evidence to suggest that television distributors are looking for more news channels. CNBC, Bloomberg, Fox Business, Weather Channel and C-SPAN's services also cover the news in various ways, as well as every major broadcaster. If distributors want another news channel, there are many to be had, particularly international services like BBC World News (which Comcast has rolled out in a big way, in the aftermath of its acquisition of NBC), France 24 (an English-language service widely carried by Time Warner Cable in New York), RT (the former Russia Today, with the Russian perspective on the news, also in English) and, Al Jazeera English.
That said, Current's "shelf space" has value. If Current were to be acquired by an existing US programmer, it could be bundled with their existing portfolio of channels and rebranded. Perhaps the best fit of all would be for Disney/ABC and Univision to acquire Current to jumpstart the distribution of their new English-language, Latino-targeted news service. That service current-ly exists as a website, but is planned to launch for cable distribution in 2013 from a base in Miami.
Another take: USA Today's Michael Wolff sees Current going into the hands of an online media company like Huffington Post or TMZ
A 60-million subscriber network is usually worth at least $15 per subscriber or $750 million, sometimes considerably more. However, one wonders what, exactly, is the programming opportunity for Current. Fox News is the news service on the right, MSNBC is the news service on the left and CNN is the news service in the middle. Not that Current is, strictly speaking, a news service, being more about talk shows than newscasts. Headline News has also morphed from a news service into a talk show channel.
Despite the attractive qualities of news programming (original, live and essentially DVR-proof), there is little evidence to suggest that television distributors are looking for more news channels. CNBC, Bloomberg, Fox Business, Weather Channel and C-SPAN's services also cover the news in various ways, as well as every major broadcaster. If distributors want another news channel, there are many to be had, particularly international services like BBC World News (which Comcast has rolled out in a big way, in the aftermath of its acquisition of NBC), France 24 (an English-language service widely carried by Time Warner Cable in New York), RT (the former Russia Today, with the Russian perspective on the news, also in English) and, Al Jazeera English.
That said, Current's "shelf space" has value. If Current were to be acquired by an existing US programmer, it could be bundled with their existing portfolio of channels and rebranded. Perhaps the best fit of all would be for Disney/ABC and Univision to acquire Current to jumpstart the distribution of their new English-language, Latino-targeted news service. That service current-ly exists as a website, but is planned to launch for cable distribution in 2013 from a base in Miami.
Another take: USA Today's Michael Wolff sees Current going into the hands of an online media company like Huffington Post or TMZ
25 October 2012
The Bullied Becomes the Bully
Stop me if you think you've heard this one before. Someone pays a lot for the local sports rights to a professional team and starts a new regional sports network. The cable operators (and other distributors like DirecTV, Dish Network, AT&T U-Verse and Verizon) complain that the channel is too expensive and that they can't possibly pass through this increase to their customers and they should be able to carry the new channel on a secondary tier, a sports tier or on an a la carte basis.
In February, Time Warner Cable was making the exact same complaints about the cost of MSG Network, the home of the disappointingly short-lived Linsanity-era New York Knicks.
There are three ways these disputes end. The most common is that the distributor agrees to carry the new sports channel on basic, possibly getting some sort of price break, sometimes after a long hold out (e.g., YES Network on Cablevision). Less commonly, the distributor decides not to carry the channel at all (but a critical mass of other distributors do agree to carry it -- the YES Network has never been carried on Dish Network). Still even less commonly, the new rightsholder throws in the towel and sells the rights to someone else (e.g., Victory Sports One, a venture of the Minnesota Twins).
So it goes.
Today's example is the new regional sports network featuring the Los Angeles Lakers of the NBA. In a twist on the usual Time Warner Cable, the largest cable operator in the Los Angeles DMA is the owner of the rights. Cox, the largest cable operator in the San Diego DMA is complaining about the cost.
In February, Time Warner Cable was making the exact same complaints about the cost of MSG Network, the home of the disappointingly short-lived Linsanity-era New York Knicks.
There are three ways these disputes end. The most common is that the distributor agrees to carry the new sports channel on basic, possibly getting some sort of price break, sometimes after a long hold out (e.g., YES Network on Cablevision). Less commonly, the distributor decides not to carry the channel at all (but a critical mass of other distributors do agree to carry it -- the YES Network has never been carried on Dish Network). Still even less commonly, the new rightsholder throws in the towel and sells the rights to someone else (e.g., Victory Sports One, a venture of the Minnesota Twins).
So it goes.
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