NFL Network Gets New Deal with Comcast; Peacock Gets Exclusive NFL Playoff Game

Today news broke that the NFL had agreed to sell the rights to a playoff game to Comcast's past-nascent-but-not-yet-well-established Peacock streaming service. This is quite a coup for Peacock. Generally, the NFL, as the purveyor of the most popular sports programming sticks to leading television services for their marquee events. Amazon Prime Video, after all, started with a package of often-lackluster Thursday night regular season games in its first NFL season.

Close observers will note that less than two weeks ago, on May 2, 2023, NFL chief Roger Goodell and Comcast leader Brian Roberts were personally involved in negotiating a new agreement for NFL Network and NFL Red Zone, restoring the service to the systems of nation's largest cable operator after they had been dropped a day earlier.

It appears the parties recognized that each had something the other really wanted.

Since we were so rudely interrupted, a summary of the last year's developments

The impact of the coronavirus and the changes to daily life in response to trying to slow the spread of it need no further discussion from me, hence a short list:

• movie theatres closed
• sports suspended at all levels
• lots of people at home
• much more online shopping
• nearly complete shutdown of typical professional television and movie production

In my professional neck-of-the-woods, there's three big things to talk about:

1. The continued ascension of non-linear Internet-delivered video
2. The resultant continued demise of "cable TV" (a/k/a "pay TV" or multichannel subscription video) be it delivered by a cable, satellite, telco or "non-facilities-based" provider like Sling TV
3. Perhaps the most interesting -- how the coronavirus lockdown has forced experimentation with new forms of video production

Streaming video

These last fourteen months have shown continued big subscriber growth by Netflix, and much bigger growth since the pandemic was declared, but that's just the start of the streaming video developments.

Disney+ launched on November 12, 2019 at a price of $6.99 per month (less than Netflix's cheapest plan) and showed better-than-expected take-up right away. Disney programmed the new streaming service aggressively. Its billion dollar first year original programming budget is considerably more than an entertainment basic cable network would spent. And that expenditure showed up right away to consumers in the form of Star Wars spin-off The Mandalorian, a project that in earlier times would have found its way to theatres or home video or ABC. Disney+ was marketed aggressively as was expected. The consumer take-up with strong right out-of-the-box with 26.5 million subscribers by December 28. Less expected was the Black Friday discount offer $60 for one year. 

The quick take-up of Disney+ thoroughly demolished the theory that streaming is a special business that the incumbents cannot be competitive in. In retrospect, perhaps it shouldn't have been a surprise -- none of the tactics that Disney employed were significantly outside its core competence in marketing movies and cable TV networks.

Hulu joined Disney with a very aggressive Black Friday discount offer -- $1.99 per month for 12 months (versus regular retail of $4.99 per month).

AT&T saw Disney's successful launch of Disney+ and looks to be following its playbook. It started with aggressive pre-launch pricing by HBO Max -- $11.99 per month for 12 months (versus typical retail of $14.99 per month for HBO alone). As noted in Multichannel News, this is $1 per month less than the most popular Netflix service package. It probably puts a lot of pressure on incumbent cable operators, as it offers more content than the cable version of HBO at what is in most cases a lower retail price. As we get closer to HBO Max's launch on May 27, we'll see if AT&T manages a programming splash as big as The Mandalorian. It doesn't look like any of their launch shows have that kind of profile and the shutdown of production due to the pandemic is probably part of that.

Part of the success of Netflix is that it has expanded the range of its offerings. It has had significant success expanding into unscripted entertainment - lowbrow, middlebrow, and high(ish)brow: Tiger King, Tidying Up with Marie Kondo, Salt, Fat, Acid, Heat. As a Netflix subscription is a household subscription, having a greater variety of programming should lower churn, as dropping the service affects more people in the household (and/or the children away at college who use the household login).

Amazon made its number of Prime subscribers public in 2018 (100 million! considerably more than analysts had estimated) and by year end 2019 it was over 150 million. At a retail of $119 annually, that's an annual revenue stream of nearly $19 billion dollars. By media standards that's a lot of money, even if most of its value for customers is in free shipping, rather than video. However, for some perspective, in 2019, Comcast's cable unit had just over $22 billion in video revenue, and that represented a slight decline from the prior year.

Pulling back, the big advantage that Netflix and similar streaming services have with consumers relative to cable TV is that they are, still, much, much less expensive than the incumbent service. The big basic cable package provides good value to a household that wants and uses all of that programming, but at $75 or so, it's price dwarfs Netflix at $8 (for a single person household). No one has time to watch all of the programming on Netflix, so the greater volume and variety of basic cable is simply expensive overkill for many households, particularly those of young people, who, at least in the recent past, go out a lot. Add in an antenna (or Locast) to get the major broadcasters and that's a very attractive offering for young adults or households that don't highly value cable exclusive national and regional sports services like ESPN/Fox Sports 1/NBCSN and YES/NESN/MASN.

It's unclear if the availability of these streaming services on computers, tablets, and phones is a big deal or not, but it is certainly a plus.

The Achilles heel of these services was thought to be bandwidth caps from Internet Service Providers (typically the cable operator), but these haven't shown up that widely or onerously. As the cable operators know better than anyone, steaming video helps sell a fast Internet connection and their business delivering that service is far more valuable than the legacy business of delivering packaged video services as it has both faster growth and higher margins.

Changes with cable TV subscriptions

Continued video subscriber losses by MVPDs (multichannel video programming distributors a/k/a cable and satellite TV providers). It is ugly. vMVPDs growth slows, then the leaders, DirecTV and Dish's Sling start losing subscribers. One analyst described the possibility of "a rapid death spiral for the category", with the category being "linear subscription TV".

Given that people are spending much more time at home and are bored, these should be the best of times for cable TV. So, why the potential death spiral? Cable TV has always been positioned in the market as a premium product -- something you buy if you want more/better than what you can get free over-the-air. Now, it is considerably less premium on two fronts:

First, new high-profile programming by cable networks is being cut back (because of declining numbers of cable subscribers) and a lot of those marquee new shows are...going to streaming instead. Television producers see streaming providers (Netflix, Amazon Prime, Apple TV+, HBO Max) as a more attractive destination for a new show than cable network -- they may pay more in license fees and they definitely support the shows with a lot of off-air promotion (e.g., billboards in NYC). 

Second, losing sports is painful. It is a key driver of the cable bundle's value and there may be no good programming substitute. We'll see how the Korean Baseball Organization fares on ESPN. Even if the games are compelling, it's hard to imagine there's a way to instantly have a country develop a rooting interest in the Korean teams. Baseball, among all major sports, is the one whose interest falls off the most below the top professional level. College football is nearly as popular as the NFL. College basketball and the NBA have a similar relationship, but that's far from the relative popularity of college baseball or minor league baseball relative to MLB.

What have we learned?

• Stock market valuations of streaming (i.e., Netflix) created huge economic incentive for Disney and others to get into streaming, even if it will cost significant short term profitability, the public markets will reward it. 
• It is unlikely that net-net that Disney will come out ahead during this crisis since coronavirus may have a great negative impact on so many of its lines of business (theme parks, movies in cinemas, sports, and advertising). No other media and entertainment company may be hit on so many fronts, as Rich Greenfield of LightShed describes very well.
• Retransmission consent fees may be going up dramatically -- mostly from deals negotiated over the preceding years, but the decline in multichannel subs is a threat to that revenue stream
• Locast's free broadcast TV service is still operating and has expanded into new markets. It has also finally been sued by broadcasters and sued back. Its existential question remains: will it win its case or lose and suffer the fate of Aereo?

Changes in video production

To me the most interesting development in the TV industry in the last fourteen months is less what we don't have, than the new things that we have gotten. We've had a crash course in new ways of producing television (at home instead of on a set in a studio, using a webcam or phone in lieu of a multiple pro camera setup) and most of it is pretty OK. Local news doesn't seem to suffer a lot by having their anchors at home instead of bantering at a desk. And that's also revealing -- making a more personal relationship between viewer and "talent", as noted in Vogue (with its first link from this blog).

The NFL draft, which for years has been in a dogged pursuit to amp up its production values -- they were planning to use boats to ferry the picks to the stage this year, really -- actually got some great reviews of its home-based draft this year, probably in part to the fact that the stars of that show are regular people (as far as TV skills go) and seeing them in a home environment made them more relatable to the audience, especially NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell who appeared largely human. This fascinating Forbes article, by my friend and former colleague Howard Homonoff, describes the very interesting and innovative video production tech the NFL used.

Seeing musicians perform at home had much that same charm, irrespective of the genre of the music. Billie Eilish in her bedroom with her brother from iHeart's concert of pop stars to a show tune reconceived for Zoom in broadway.com's Sondheim concert.

full clip of Billie's performance is no longer available on YouTube, sadly

full disclosure: that's my office chair that Ann Harada is sitting on in this clip

The music videos produced during this period -- I'd put forward CHVRCHES "Forever" (Separate but Together) as an archetype -- remind me of the simple and fun music videos of the early video age...and we get to see the artists in their homes (or something like it) and that's often fun.

There will be a huge impact on commercial production as well. Given the upheaval in consumer's lives, the advertising messages suitable for before the coronavirus are often ill suited to our lives now (sometimes frighteningly so).

Producing new commercials without the usual camera and sound crew creates new challenges. One actor of my acquaintance shared that she was being asked to film herself at home -- for a national commercial with a DSLR or other similar high end, but decidedly consumer video equipment. (Having the performer supply more of the means of production, apologies to Karl Marx is nothing new -- newspaper reporters don't have to go into the office to type up their stories on the newsroom computer system, and many, perhaps most, audio books are made by voice artists working in home studios. The costs are much lower and the quality difference is much smaller than it once was. Workers' might be a step closer to...emancipation with this ownership.)

So, what's new with you?

Charter Switches from EBUs to Billables for Subscriber Reporting

Close observers of cable MSO financials noted a significant change stuck in the footnotes of Charter's 4Q15 and year end financial statements:

(e) Charter revised its methodology for counting customers who reside in residential multiple dwelling units ("MDUs") that are billed under bulk contracts.  Beginning in the fourth quarter of 2015, we count and report customers based on the number of billed units within each bulk MDU, similar to recent reporting changes at our peers and reflecting the completion of all-digital which requires a direct billing relationship for all units which receive a set-top box.  Previously, our methodology for reporting residential customers generally excluded units under bulk arrangements, unless those units had a direct billing relationship.  Prior year information has been revised to reflect our revised methodology.

emphasis added to highlight the following: The use of billable subscriber counts -- pioneered by Comcast in 1Q2013 -- leads to generally higher numbers than EBU counts. It is a rosier picture to investors.

The corresponding footnote in 3Q15 read as follows:
(h) Included within commercial video customers are those in commercial structures, which are calculated on an equivalent bulk unit ("EBU") basis.  We calculate EBUs by dividing the bulk price charged to accounts in an area by the published rate charged to non-bulk residential customers in that market for the comparable tier of service. This EBU method of estimating video customers is consistent with the methodology used in determining costs paid to programmers and is consistent with the methodology used by other multiple system operators.  As we increase our published video rates to residential customers without a corresponding increase in the prices charged to commercial service customers, our EBU count will decline even if there is no real loss in commercial service customers.

Charter reported residential basics 4,322,000 up from 4,293,000 at year end 2014 under the billable methodology. However, at year end 2014, Charter reported only 4,160,000 EBUs, so the Residential Basic subscriber count for billable subs was 3.2% higher than for EBUs. That seems a bit odd. Residential subscribers shouldn't vary much from EBUs. The reason that comes to mind of why residential billables would be higher than residential EBUs is if a material portion of the residential subscribers are seasonal accounts who pay a much lower rate in the off-season. However, Charter isn't in most of the big seasonal markets (e.g., Florida with its snowbirds).

Commercial basics were 108,000 up from 104,000 at year end 2014 under the billable methodology. At year end 2014, Charter reported 133,000 commercial video EBUs, so the billable subscriber count was 21.8% lower than the EBU count, which makes sense, since commercial accounts include multiple dwelling units and those typically get a "bulk discount". [In a bulk arrangement, 100% of a building's units get the service -- usually billed through their maintenance -- so that there is no reason for a unit to turn down the service and little churn for the cable company. For that benefit, the cable company provides a price break over the cost of all of those units subscribing independently, and potentially disconnecting.]

As Charter pointed out in 3Q15 "As we increase our published video rates to residential customers without a corresponding increase in the prices charged to commercial service customers, our EBU count will decline even if there is no real loss in commercial service customers." Looking at it from the other side, when bulk rates decline (due to furious price competition from DBS and telcos for these MDU accounts) EBU counts go down even if the MSO holds onto the business.

There is no misleading going on here. The revenues of the companies are not affected by this subscriber-counting change. This is investor spin. As there has historically been so much focus on subscriber growth, it isn't entirely surprising that the biggest MSOs have decided to deploy a measurement system that paints their results in a better light than the one that they used historically (and is still the one that they prefer to use when paying programmers like ESPN and was part of a joint industry consensus in 2002 -- clearly another time).

Comcast's New Video Service "Stream"

Last week Comcast announced a new service for streaming video and DVR service not-very-creatively named "Stream". Priced at $15 a month, it seems like an incredible value, at first.

"With Stream, Xfinity Internet customers can watch live TV from about a dozen networks - including all the major broadcast nets and HBO - on laptops, tablets and phones in their home." according to a Comcast blog post by Matt Strauss.

Inattentive reporters may lump this with Netflix as a service for cord cutters. but that's very far from accurate.

Perhaps the best way to see how this service compares to Netflix, the 800 pound gorilla of over-the-top video, is to use an analysis that I learned from a great architectural historian. In the three-column analysis, the left side has the things unique to the first building, the middle has the things the buildings have in common, and the right has the things unique to the second. Given the horizontal constraints of this blog, I've transposed the analysis to top-middle-bottom.

Unique to Stream:

• Includes live channels
• Includes broadcast channels
• Includes network DVR functionality
• Content from HBO

True for both:

• Available in Comcast's cable footprint
• Available to Comcast Internet subscribers
• Can be watched in-home
• Includes significant recent on-demand programming
• Can be watched on a computer, tablet, or phone
• Does not require a cable video subscription

Unique to Netflix:

• Viewable outside of Comcast's cable footprint (i.e., in any part of the US)
• Available to customers via any form of Internet access
• Can be watched in- and out-of-home (e.g., office, neighbor's house, mobile, coffee shop)
• Easily viewable on a TV
• Large library of movies and TV programs
• Some high profile original programming

Stream is a very different service from a Netflix.

I believe the target market for this product is customers who don't buy cable video service and customers who don't have a traditional TV set, but are interested in TV programming. I don't know how many people fit in this group, but Comcast clearly will have an easy time finding its Internet customers who don't buy TV service from them. Easy targeting allows for efficient marketing.

In offering this service, Comcast gets the following:

• An up-sell service for its Internet service
• A press release -- "we have a strategy to address cord-cutters"
• A way to monetize TV Everywhere infrastructure (As Comcast's post notes, "Xfinity Internet customers can just sign-up online, download our Xfinity TV app and start watching." (emphasis added))
• A new service that should not cannibalize the core cable video business.

That's a solid list of benefits for Comcast without a whole lot of downside. Why not?

Is it a threat to Netflix? On some level, Stream is a threat. A lot of the viewing is at home and some of it is not on the TV. Streampix, a component of Stream, does include a library of movies and TV shows, so it is a poor man's Netflix on that dimension. The inclusion of the broadcast channels would appear to have a lot of value. However, if you are the sort of person who does not own a television, I wonder how much you would value broadcast content. Also, Netflix, starting at $7.99 per month, is materially less expensive.

Is it a threat to HBO Now? As an alternative way to get the content, sure. All that we know about the usage of Netflix suggests that vast majority of its usage is in the home. While Stream would not provide the benefit of out-of-home use (or on-TV viewing) that HBO Now does, it offers a lot of other benefits, that could make that trade-off attractive to some customers. Stream seems like more of a threat to HBO Now than to Netflix. Since the price of both services is the same, how do you value HBO Now's benefits (view on the TV, view out of home) vs. Stream's (get broadcast content, get DVR functionality).

Certainly Comcast benefits strategically by creating a threat to any of the threats to its core video business. A good offense is a good defense. By utilizing its existing infrastructure and customer list, the incremental cost of this service should be modest. If it turns out that Stream is cannibalizing the core video business, Comcast can always pull the plug, like Cox did with its OTT service FlareWatch.

In the future Comcast could also address the most ridiculous limitation of Stream and let people watch it on a TV. The limitation is ridiculous because it is so clearly self-imposed and so clearly designed to protect the core video service. While I understand that as a 20-year veteran of the industry; it is exactly the thing that people hate about their cable company. As Wired's headline put it: Comcast's Streaming Service Sounds As Bad As You'd Expect. It hurts because it is true.

An OTT Watershed Moment

We could soon be looking at the watershed moment for over-the-top video: According to a Multichannel News posting, that the FCC is considering making "being a multichannel video program distributor" (MVPD) an option for online video providers (the conclusion is implied from the actual FCC .pdf release). To date, online video providers have not been able to be considered MVPDs because they do not own the facilities that transmit channels of programming to end users.

Sony's OTT video offering will be delivered to its PlayStation game consoles

In one fell swoop, this could clear up three big issues for potential OTT providers who are direct MVPD competitors, offering a package of linear "cable TV" networks.

#1 Access to top name-brand broadcast and cable network programming

Much like cable and DBS, any MVPD would have the right to negotiate with broadcast TV stations over retransmission consent and the stations would have the right to demand must-carry. For example, Aereo, which the Supreme Court declared was not legal because it distributed programming like an MVPD, but was denied the right to be an MVPD when it used the Supreme Court's argument at the US Copyright Office, would no longer be in a legal no-man's-land. Clarity on this point is overdue, as David Oxenford in BroadcastLawBlog notes, the Sky Angel case has been before the FCC for a long time, long enough, it turns out, for Sky Angel to go bust in its over-the-top incarnation.

#2 A way around online streaming restrictions in MVPD affiliation agreements

Restricting the distribution of cable programming on some "other" technology was a backdoor way to get some exclusivity, now the other MVPDs will have to negotiate exclusivity versus other MVPD competitors through the front door and many programmers have, not unreasonably, been historically reluctant to do exclusive deals that reduce MVPD competition.

#3 A way around rights issues for cable TV programming and advertising (e.g., SAG members get paid differently for commercials produced for the Internet than for those produced for TV)

Right now, only companies that explicitly clear "Internet rights" are allowed to put the programs on their TV channels on the Internet. Once an online video distributor is an MVPD, the linear stream of programs, as presented on a cable program service like Lifetime, can go to any MVPD.

[If the programmer owns the program and all its rights, like Major League Baseball, one can find MLB Extra Innings on cable TV or DBS (with internet streaming as added-value for "authenticated" subscribers), or as a stand-alone OTT offering at mlb.tv (although the TV commercials are usually not included in the Internet stream as the advertisers do not want to pay the performers for both the TV and Internet exhibition).]

Unfortunately for the soon-to-be-nascent-direct-MVPD-competitor, the over-the-top business still has two big remaining issues:

#1 Bandwidth caps

It might be politically poisonous for a cable MSO facing a direct competitor delivering "cable TV service" over-the-top to announce bandwidth caps that would make it uneconomic for any of their customers to use such a service. That said, the cable industry, like many other industries, has historically looked to protect its business against competition. Certainly that's what Netflix thought Comcast was doing when the streaming performance of Netflix customers using Comcast as their ISP declined in late 2013. Bandwidth caps would be great protection for MSOs against online video competition.

#2 The reality of the marketplace

This combines several issues: Is the consumer offering attractive enough? Are the programmers willing to negotiate with these new MVPDs? Are there terms that the programmers will find attractive enough that create a business opportunity for the new MVPDs? On the first one, Sony's rumored $80 per month offering is considerably more expensive than many had hoped.

Cable TV programmers have been supportive of new, clearly legal entrants to the program distribution business. More competition among distributors is always good news for the program suppliers who now have a new set of customers. Viacom certainly thinks so. Going over-the-top and preserving the existing pay-TV packaging (and business model) appears to be more attractive than going over-the-top on one's own like World Wrestling Entertainment's $9.99 monthly offering.

Rather than going-head-on against the pay-TV incumbents, it would seem that a more prudent course for new MVPDs would be to find a segment of the marketplace that is un- or poorly-served by the incumbents, but which also has high broadband Internet penetration. That may be a difficult combination to find.

My earlier post: The Virtual MSO Opportunity (19 July 2013)
Update (14 October 2014): Aereo asks the FCC to classify it as an MVPD (via Deadline), Brian Fung in the Washington Post thinks Aereo is making this request only in the short-term
Update (29 October 2014): FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler makes his views explicit in an FCC blog post "Tech Transitions, Video, and the Future". In short, he supports OTT video providers getting the rights that MVPDs have, believing that it will foster competition.

AT&T Buys DirecTV: Some Macro and Micro Thoughts

A few thoughts on the day after the big merger announcement:

Unlike the Comcast-Time Warner Cable-Charter proposed deal, AT&T's purchase of DirecTV "would eliminate a choice for pay-TV customers in some markets." In those areas where AT&T offers U-Verse service, a consumer likely has a choice of four competitive providers: the incumbent cable operator, Dish Network, DirecTV, and AT&T. If this merger goes through, the four choices go down to three and the new company includes one of the giant providers (as opposed to a combination of two of the smaller ones). While antitrust is far from my area of expertise, it appears that this is exactly the same outcome that doomed AT&T's attempted acquisition of T-Mobile.

While having AT&T and DirecTV under the same ownership would appear to facilitate bundling services for consumers (e.g., in non-U-Verse areas the combined company could offer phone plus DSL plus DBS plus cellphone), unless the DirecTV brand goes away, it would still appear to be the sort of shot-gun marriage that all current and prior telco-DBS "synthetic bundles" are and have been. It's not an elegant solution and "people are abandoning DSL in droves, and buying cable broadband".

When I've read of DirecTV's strong cash flow, but otherwise difficult strategic position (a TV-only provider in an increasingly bundled bustiness) and how AT&T could really use the DirecTV cash to fund its dividend, the story sounded suspiciously like Viacom's 1994 acquisition of Blockbuster to fund the acquisition it really wanted, Paramount Pictures. How did that one work out? Not that well.

Would AT&T apply the DirecTV brand to U-Verse video offering? Maybe that's a better idea. As AT&T's press release on the deal states: DirecTV is "the premier pay TV brand with the best content". The U-Verse brand is probably meaningless. Why anyone has a brand with a hyphen in it is beyond me. It is clunky and not web-friendly (the URL for the service is uverseonline.att.net, although u-verse.com does redirect to it -- why have consumers wonder if they include the hyphen or not. DirecTV's URL is simply directv.com).

This deal should seem like a homecoming for Dan York, DirecTV's chief content acquisition executive. It was just 2 years ago that he left that same role at AT&T.

Programming savings will not be as easy to come by as they are in a typical cable acquisition. DirecTV's distribution rights may be limited to its single DBS system and, if that's the case, would not have the right to simply add AT&T's systems to its affiliation agreements (and take advantage of DirecTV's greater purchasing power). Comcast, by comparison, would very likely have the right to do exactly that with the Time Warner Cable systems. It is always simpler if one does not have to negotiate. DirecTV already has relatively low programming costs as it is a giant pay-TV distributor; the programming cost savings would largely come for the much smaller base of AT&T U-Verse customers.

Could the NFL allow DirecTV to sell Sunday Ticket on U-Verse as well as DBS, but not provide it to other distributors? That could be interesting, but it would have to be negotiated. It is very unlikely that DirecTV would have the right to extend Sunday Ticket to additional platforms under its current (and expiring) deal. Would give U-Verse a leg up that it has never had before, but only a limited footprint in which it could take advantage of it. It would be an odd decision for the NFL: Sunday Ticket would be available from two providers in a minority of the country and one provider in the vast majority of the country. That's not an obvious thing to explain to consumers.

NFL Sunday Ticket is clearly on AT&T's mind. From its 8K filing about the deal: "The parties also have agreed that in the event that DIRECTV’s agreement for the 'NFL Sunday Ticket' service is not renewed substantially on the terms discussed between the parties, the Company may elect not to consummate the Merger, but the Company will not have a damages claim arising out of such failure so long as DIRECTV used its reasonable best efforts to obtain such renewal."

Packaging differences: Would DirecTV try to make the DBS and U-Verse packages of services more similar. Or would the combined company enjoy the dealmaking flexibility of having good-better-best on 2 different platforms and now have more ways to split the baby. In any event, the companies say they don't plan any large packaging changes.

Other perspectives:

• VideoNuze's Will Richmond is not a fan of the backward-looking deal.
• Howard Homonoff sees more work for the federal communications bar.
• Multichannel News's Mike Farrell sees 5 reasons the merger might not fly.
• The Diffusion Group's Joel Espelien thinks that AT&T needs DirecTV to have TV Everywhere video content for its wireless and broadband customers. I think he's totally off-base. TVE is a small portion of video content online and not even used by most pay-TV customers.
• Deadline's David Lieberman thinks Peter Chernin and over-the-top video is the key to the deal. I would tend to doubt that.

Comcast's Offer for Time Warner Cable

A few quick notes about the proposed transaction:

• Comcast's offer of $159 per TWC share is very close to TWC CEO Rob Marcus's proposal to sell the company to Charter for $160.
• Comcast's offer has no break-up fee for either side, Comcast can abandon the deal at any time and Time Warner Cable, presumably, can entertain a better offer from Charter or someone else
• Comcast has also offered to divest 3 million TWC subscribers, presumably to address concerns that the merged company would be too big; the "cats & dogs" of TWC's former national division would be likely divestiture candidates, unless some of them are contiguous to existing Comcast systems.
• Comcast has made bold offers before and walked away when investor support for the deal was not there (its 2008 offer for Walt Disney)
• Because Comcast and Time Warner Cable have few systems which compete directly with each other, there would be little direct impact on consumers -- their number of choices of providers would not be reduced. Consumer Reports looks at it this way. Comparing the impact on competition to the stillborn AT&T T-Mobile deal is off-base.
• The deal is good news for the channels of NBC Universal, which now are more likely to gain carriage on Time Warner Cable's systems. NBCSN and Golf Channel, which are carried on digital in Time Warner Cable's New York City system (link is to .pdf), will likely end up with parity (expanded basic) carriage with ESPN.
• The vendors that sell to the companies (non-NBCU programmers, hardware companies, billing systems providers) who will now be dealing with a larger customer and fewer attractive alternatives if they say "no" are the biggest losers if the deal goes through.
• Charter is likely a loser if the deal closes. If it sees increasing its scale a business imperative, the biggest available target will be off the market. Cox and Cablevision are the next biggest available companies and they have rebuffed multiple offers to sell. The cable companies smaller than them (e.g., Mediacom) are much smaller with fewer than 2 million subscribers. Charter would have to buy nearly all of them to increase its scale as much as a Time Warner Cable deal would have.
• Another loser might be Apple. TWC appeared to be creating an app for the Apple TV box; Comcast hasn't been, seeing its X1 guide as preferable.
• Closing price of CMCSA on 13 Feb 2014 (the date the deal was announced) = $52.97. TWC = $144.81. CMCSA x 2.875 (stock exchange ratio) = $152.29. Implies some uncertainty about the deal closing.
• Cablevision will still be the largest cable operator in the New York DMA by subscribers, but the combined Comcast-Time Warner Cable will be a major player in New York and the dominant provider in virtually all of the other top 25 DMAs (exceptions: Cox-Phoenix #12, Charter-St. Louis #21, see Rich Greenfield's chart @ https://twitter.com/RichBTIG/status/433960562309861376/photo/1
• Slate's take on the deal negotiation -- it's not very different from any other time you call the cable company

Update (14 Feb 2014): Mark DeCambre on the website Quartz quotes a Gekko-like Goldman Sachs research note praising the deal for giving pricing power to the new company with the charming pull quote "M&A that drives an industry toward oligopoly is the good kind."
Update (16 Feb 2014): Paul Krugman's column in the New York Times. Barons of Broadband. Pull quote: "The truth, however, is that many goods and especially services aren’t subject to international competition: New Jersey families can’t subscribe to Korean broadband."
Update (18 Feb 2014): Another likely loser with this deal is Netflix. TWC was in talks to carry/sell Netflix to its video customers, something Comcast has rejected. Now, per Bloomberg, "the talks are on hold".
Update (19 Feb 2014): As my former colleague Howard Homonoff astutely notes, Google Fiber's announcement that it will enter additional markets is very good news for Comcast in securing government approval for the deal.
Update (19 Feb 2014): Another loser in this deal may be CBS which would see the TWC systems move from the recently-and-contentiously-negotiated deal to an older, more distributor-favorable Comcast deal, according to this LA Times article. It is standard in cable affiliation agreements for the acquirer to have the right to add one or all "after-acquired systems" to its affiliation agreements and delete the systems from their prior agreement. In fact, Comcast would likely do this for all its agreements that are more favorable than TWC's (and should TWC have any more favorable deals than Comcast, Comcast might be able to move its incumbent systems to those newly-acquired deals).
Update (20 Feb 2014): Bill Niemeyer of The Diffusion Group believes that John Malone may not have really wanted Time Warner Cable for Charter because the Comcast/TWC merger noise creates an opportunity for Charter to act under the radar. Maybe, Dr. Malone does prefer to be out of sight of the regulators, but I find it hard to think that anything Dr. Malone does will go unnoticed.
Update (20 Feb 2014): DirecTV's CEO thinks the deal should get "appropriately scrutinized". In the past, DirecTV has criticized Comcast's dealmaking for its regional sports networks.

Comcast's Xfinity Store: Looking Deeper on the Despicable Me 2 Headline

I was surprised by the reports of the strong showing of the Comcast's new Xfinity TV Store in the sale of Despicable Me 2. 

A strong start for the Xfinity TV Store is counterintuitive in several ways:  Apple's iTunes Store or Amazon.com, the big sellers of downloadable content, are generally considered good retailers of content. Xfinity's brand is not known for downloadable "owned" content. Usually sales for a new business are pretty modest as potential customers wait to see if the vendor is reliable, etc.

Comcast, which is always aggressive in playing up its good news, issued a press release that its new store sold more downloadable copies of the title than iTunes or Amazon or Walmart's Vudu or anyone else. There is another data point in support of a strong start for the Xfinity TV Store: Todd Spangler reported in Variety that the Comcast store was also the top seller of The Hunger Games for its first 2 weeks of release.  While Despicable Me 2 is from Universal Studios, which is owned by Comcast (and may have gotten some extra promotion for that reason), Lionsgate, the studio behind The Hunger Games, is a true third party. Is it possible that Comcast is already an important outlet in the electronic sell-through market? If so, how and why?

 
While the Xfinity store is available to all US Internet households on the web, there was probably little awareness of it as a purchase option outside of the 20% or so of the households that are Comcast subscribers. When I searched for "Xfinity Store Despicable Me 2" I did not find the sort of product index page like one finds for Amazon or iTunes, I found this -- no download to own online link at all under "Available Online". Instead, the circled text says "The full movie is currently not available Online."

It doesn't appear that Xfinity is providing any special value to consumers. The Xfinity-purchased Despicable Me 2 is not offering any better/different features than those available from other sellers of the title. If anything, Xfinity's TV Store page to market the title is much weaker.

Clicking on the "Available on TV" button on the Xfinity Despicable Me 2 page yielded this screen: As you will note, at this time there is no online rental option, only a purchase option (see inside the marked oval) and no mention at all that consumers making this purchase can also view it online, download to other devices, etc. So the big innovation does not appear to be the play anywhere feature of the purchase, but simply that Comcast is effectively using the pay-per-view movie rental store to sell movies before they are available in the rental window. Comcast isn't doing something better than Amazon or iTunes, they are doing something different.. 

Upon close inspection, the Xfinity store does have two clear advantages over iTunes, Amazon and Vudu. First, the store is available in the cable system's electronic program guide, the primary place viewers search for something to watch. Second, purchases from Xfinity are integrated into the cable set-top box's navigation; the viewer does not have to switch his or her TV to input 2. 

In contrast, purchases from Amazon or iTunes require a separate search (on a computer or tablet or phone) and typically require the use of a separate device (Roku or Apple TV or blu-ray or Chromecast) for viewing on the household's main TV. Also, that TV has to be switched to another input. While switching inputs might not seem like a big deal to many, only 2 of the 4 members of my household can do it reliably and Bright House, the cable MSO, offers a tech support page devoted to the topic. 

Strategically, if the MSOs enter the electronic sell-through business in a bigger way and these movie-rental-searching-during-the-sell-through-window and "input 1" advantages are borne out, the cable distributors could become even more important purchasers of content. The last decade has seen MSO's bargaining power eroding with strong basic cable programmers and top broadcast stations. Being a force in electronic sell-through would not change that. However, on a more macro level, strength in electronic sell-through would tend to improve distributors' bargaining position with content suppliers. For that alone, this is a development to monitor. 

Update (10 Feb 2014): Lionsgate's CEO stated on 7 February 2014 that Comcast represents 15% of the US electronic sell-through market and that he expects other MVPDs will enter the market.
Update (10 Mar 2014): Netflix's House of Cards will be sold in the Xfinity store, which Comcast Cable CEO Neil Smit notes "has surprised us" in how well it has done.

A Milestone: An MSO's Broadband Subs Exceed Its Video Subs

For all the talk of how broadband has become the core service for cable TV operators, famously by Time Warner Cable CEO Glenn Britt in 2011, for many operators, the number of video subscribers has continued to exceed the number of Internet (or high speed data or cable modem customers). Charter, one of the largest US cable companies, hit a milestone in the second quarter of 2013. It reported 3.924 million residential high speed data customers and 3.917 million residential video customers. No other major publicly traded cable operator has ever reported that.


2Q13 Subs in 000       Video  Broadband   Broadband/Video
Comcast               21,776 19,986      0.92 
Time Warner           11,720 11,074      0.94 
Charter                3,917   3,924      1.00 
Cablevision            2,868   2,787      0.97 
TOTAL                 40,281 37,771      0.94 

ESPN 3D Is Dead, Here Comes Ultra HD

With the announcement yesterday that ESPN is shutting down its 3D service, it appears that any chance that 3DTV would catch on with consumers has bitten the dust.

My view is that what doomed 3DTV was less the glasses required for 3D viewing -- which are a significant issue -- but more the fact that 3DTV simply wasn't that compelling a viewing experience. 

I remember heading to the 2010 Cable Show in Los Angeles, convinced that I was going to buy a 3D TV upon my return home -- industry interest in 3D was sky high and it looked like a very promising new business opportunity. However, after seeing every single 3D demo on the exhibit floor -- maybe 25 in all -- I though that the experience was underwhelming, when it wasn't actually bad.

What is most interesting about the experiment with 3DTV is how it completely tracked the initial enthusiasm for 3D movies in the 1950s and then their subsequent fall from favor. Around 1980 or so I saw the 3D Creature from the Black Lagoon and Dial M for Murder, but they didn't make me wish that the big films of that period, like Jaws or Star Wars, were in 3D.

In contrast with that experience, this year I saw Ultra HD (also known as 4K) sets on the exhibit floor this year (in Comcast's and Samsung's booths) and both looked pretty spectacular. I don't know if Ultra HD's combination of price, content availability and quality will ever get sufficient traction to be successful in the market, but I do know that the quality is uniformly very good and readily apparent.

Ultra HD set from Samsung booth -- photo does not do it justice; Van Gogh's Café Terrace at Night

Interestingly, the content that might first make a difference on these sets may be consumers own still photographs. Still pictures of masterpiece paintings were used on the demo by Samsung. Consumers' photos are already available in resolutions far beyond that of a 1080p set. An Ultra HD Apple TV device might be a great early use case. Apple already has experience with greater than 1080p resolution displays from their experience with the "Retina" displays in both the iPad and certain MacBook Pros.

More on this: Brian Stelter, New York Times

Counting Bulks with Comcast's CFO

In his opening comments on the Comcast 1Q 2013 earnings call, CFO Michael Angelakis made some curious statements about counting subscribers in bulk-billed accounts:

In addition, we implemented equipment price increases for [D to As] and HD DVRs to this larger base, which in combination negatively impacted our customer base during the quarter. However, about half of our video subscriber losses were due to the methodology we use to count [MDU] subscribers under our bulk contracts and the other half were primarily video-only customers.

As you may know, we count video customers that are billed under bulk contracts on an FCC equivalent or [EBU] basis, which results in fewer customers as rates increase. In order to improve our transparency in how we report and manage these bulk contracts, we’ll be changing our external reporting to a billable units methodology at the end of the year. We believe this change will reinforce our operational focus in this customer segment, and align our video customer account methodology with the rest of the cable industry.

Comcast's spiffy logo, NBC's peacock was added in December

Let's parse these statements. Comcast is changing its methodology used to count MDU (multiple dwelling unit -- e.g., apartment buildings) subscribers. The industry-standard method for paying programmers is that MDUs are paid on an "EBU basis". EBU stands for equivalent billing unit (or equivalent basic unit). The concept is that if a building gets a package of service that costs $15,000 per month and a residential subscriber with the same package would pay $100 per month, then the building has the equivalent of 150 residential subscribers, irrespective of the number of actual units in the building who are receiving service. Typically bulk-billed accounts get a rate break, in exchange for providing service to every unit (where the cost is bundled into the building's maintenance fees to the tenants), the cable operator will charge the building something less than the full retail price (since it doesn't have to market the service to each apartment individually). Historically for cable operators, the bulk discount was 30% -- a building with 100 units would be charged at the equivalent of 70 residential subscribers.

One of the most competitive parts of the multichannel television business is providing service to MDUs. Individual apartments face a host of issues subscribing to DirecTV or Dish Network, notably the need a place to put a dish antenna that can see the provider's satellites -- a challenge if one does not have access to the roof. The building itself, however, does not have this problem -- it owns the roof. Dish and DirecTV aggressively discount their services for apartment buildings -- as DirecTV notes on its website to building owners: "you can offer your residents the amenity of reduced package prices." Needless the say, bulk discounting often exceeds the old 30% amount. As Michael Angelakis notes, as the residential price goes up faster than the bulk price (which may not be going up at all), the EBU number is declining -- even as the number of units receiving service in the building is unchanged.

So, that describes the "old" method of counting subscribers in bulk accounts. What is the new way? Angelakis said that "we'll be changing our external reporting to a billable units methodology". This sounds to me like the count of actual units in the building getting service, irrespective of the discounting. One thing it definitely will be is a bigger number -- a great way to obfuscate the declining value of the bulk accounts. Comcast does have a history of liking to report bigger numbers. For many years it reported digital boxes it had deployed, rather than digital subscribers the way every other cable operator did. (Typically digital boxes were 40% higher than digital subscribers -- since many digital subscribers had multiple digital boxes. Note the Comcast's definition of a "digital subscription" in its 2001 annual report, it's in notes 5 and 6 on page 6.)

It is contrary to my experience that Comcast's move on counting bulks is "aligned" with the rest of the cable industry, I would have assumed the opposite. Perhaps Comcast is announcing this change now, three quarters before it plans to implement it as a way of enticing others to follow suit.

So, what have we learned? Comcast lost 60,000 basic subscribers in 1Q13 and it is attributing half of that loss, 30,000 subscribers, to lowering the cost of the video service it provides to MDUs, rather than actually serving fewer subscribers. Since we don't know how many Comcast subscribers are in bulk-billed arrangements, we don't know if that number represents a small or dramatic decline in the pricing of service to MDUs.

Updated (7 May 2013): Charter released its 1Q 2013 earnings today which included a few notes about bulks as well. This is the complete text of footnote (o):

Included within commercial video customers are those in commercial structures, which are calculated on an equivalent bulk unit ("EBU") basis. We calculate EBUs by dividing the bulk price charged to accounts in an area by the published rate charged to non-bulk residential customers in that market for the comparable tier of service. This EBU method of estimating video customers is consistent with the methodology used in determining costs paid to programmers and is consistent with the methodology used by other multiple system operators. As we increase our published video rates to residential customers without a corresponding increase in the prices charged to commercial service customers, our EBU count will decline even if there is no real loss in commercial service customers. For example, commercial video customers decreased by 10,000 during the three months ended March 31, 2013 due to published video rate increases.

Apparently, Charter is seeing the same drop in bulks due to effectively lower pricing in the MDU market that Comcast is seeing. Additionally, unlike Comcast, Charter sees counting commercial subs on an EBU basis as "consistent with the methodology used by other multiple system operators".

Aereo Adds First Cable Channel - Bloomberg TV

Aereo announced today that it has added its first non-broadcast television service, Bloomberg TV, to its multichannel service. This marks an evolution in the Aereo service and a step towards, possibly, becoming a larger competitor to a traditional multichannel subscription from a cable, DBS or telco provider.

For Bloomberg, the attraction of affiliating with Aereo is clear. In a traditional multichannel package, its placement is typically less favorable than Comcast/NBCU's CNBC, the category leader, and, sometimes less favorable than the third entrant, Fox Business. Bloomberg is not only the only business news service on this platform, it is the only 24-hour news service. Bloomberg's carriage vis a vis CNBC is the subject of a continuing dispute with Comcast. New York is Aereo's only current TV market and Bloomberg's most important one. While Aereo likely has a modest number of subscribers, you can be certain that its choices are watched closely by the incumbents with which it competes.

The risk to Bloomberg in stepping out with Aereo is probably smaller than it is for most other cable programmers:

• Bloomberg is already streamed free on the web at http://www.bloomberg.com/tv/; the service has been available over-the-top for a long time. Few other cable services are. 
• Bloomberg is sold a la carte by at least one distributor, Dish Network. Few other cable services are.
• Cable programming represents a very small portion of Bloomberg Media. 85% of its revenue comes from the rental of Bloomberg information "terminals" to financial professionals. The company has annual revenues of about $8 billion. Bloomberg has only one US TV programming service; all the major US programmers operate multiple networks. SNL Kagan estimates Bloomberg TV's 2012  license fee revenue at less than $60 million. The channel draws several times that in advertising, far from the more typical 50/50 license fee/advertising revenue split for a cable network.
• Most importantly, Bloomberg is not involved in broadcast television (like Disney, Comcast/NBCU, CBS, Fox or Univision), so it is not currently being sued by Aereo. 

The biggest question now is whether any of the more typical cable programmers will follow Bloomberg onto Aereo.

some prior posts about Aereo:
Dog Bites Man - Broadcasters Sue Aereo (2 Mar 2012)
Aereo (Beta) Arrives in NYC - Broadcasters Likely Peeved (15 Feb 2012)

Intel-evision?

According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, Intel is looking to develop at web-based video service to compete with cable and satellite. Intel's plan is to create a virtual MSO, a business idea that many have been kicking around in one form or another.

Consumers would welcome another choice of video provider. As one measure of customer satisfaction, Consumerist's cheeky "Worst Company in America" 2012 bracket features eight providers of multichannel television (Comcast, DirecTV, Dish, Time Warner Cable, Charter, Verizon, AT&T and CenturyLink), among its 32 "contestants".

However, facts are stubborn things (hat tip, John Adams). Multichannel penetration is very high ~90% -- there are relatively few households who do not see it  as a worthwhile purchase, despite the fact that subscription prices increase every year. That suggests that the customer satisfaction issue is likely less the service itself (not that it doesn't have its frustrations - long times on hold, among them), than frustration with the price and general lack of choice. (If it didn't, Charter wouldn't be doing things like this.)

If Intel were to offer a me-too service (i.e., a comparable package of services) at a lower price, it would likely attract some customers. However, multichannel providers are already cutting prices in a de facto way, as they offer sweetheart deals for new customers, particularly in areas of high competition. It isn't easy to compete on the low end with customers churning through the introductory offers in search of the best deal.

The me-too offering would have a competitive advantage if its operating cost of delivering the service were lower than the incumbents. It won't be because of lower programming costs. A new entrant into the market, like Intel, can expect to pay 20% or more greater programming costs than the incumbents. Intel wouldn't have to build the expensive distribution system (laying cable, launching satellites) that the incumbents did, but would be on the hook for the variable cost of delivering bits to its customers. The jury is still out on how much less expensive that would be. However, that does make Intel, like Netflix, highly dependent on the ISPs (who are the cable and telephone companies) to continue to provide unlimited service to their customers.

There are alternatives to a me-too service, of course. A la carte offerings of channels is a popular request, but one that it is hard to imagine the programming community embracing. (LA Times: Don't hold your breath for a la carte cable -- is that clear enough?) Given the high penetration of multichannel television, there isn't much reason for the programmers to look at a different, potentially less lucrative business model, unless they have to do so (as the music industry had to, after rampant piracy ended their chokehold on packaging and pricing). However, the multichannel subscription television market probably has less piracy today than it did in the past, due to the changeover from less-secure analog systems to more-secure digital ones). So, it won't be driven by piracy, at least not today's piracy, but maybe tomorrow's.

This is not the first Intel over-the-top story. GigaOm reported earlier this year that Intel was "in talks to buy Roku". BTW, Roku is now looking to raise some $50 million to expand...hmmm.

It is always interesting to see new entrants to an industry as that's often the origin of the new ideas that shake things up (Walt Disney's theme parks, Apple's iPod, iPhone and iPad). If Intel has that sort of idea, there will be a place in the market for them. There is certainly room for innovation in the distribution of television.